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 419 Plan Administrator Permanently Enjoined from Doing Business

  How quickly we forget the tax avoidance plans that went down in flames when the IRS turned its scrutinous eye on it. One of the biggest ones in our industry’s history is the 419 welfare benefit plan.   419 plans (more properly known as 419A(f)6 multiple employer plans or more recently known as 419(e)3 single employer plans) were the industry darlings back in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They were “employee benefit plans” that allowed business owners to take tax deductions through their company to buy life insurance inside the 419 plan.   The policies were allowed to grow tax free and, ultimately, when the owners hit retirement, they would terminate their involvement in the plan; and the policies would be distributed to the owners who would then own them individually and borrow from them tax free in retirement.    419 plans were sold as the tax-deductible purchase of life insurance and became the favorite of many insurance agents looking to sell $100,000+ annual premium cases.   Of course, when a large segment of an industry starts incorrectly marketing a plan as the tax-deductible purchase of life insurance, the IRS starts taking a close look; and that’s certainly what happened

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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida, July Term, A.D. 2011

Opinion filed November 23, 2011. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

No. 3D11-198
Lower Tribunal No. 10-2368

Ivonne Grisolia, as personal representative of the Estate of Favio Jose Grisolia Sanchez (a/k/a Fabrizzio Grisolia) Appellant, vs. Eric and Carla Pfeffer, Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria M. Korvick, Judge. Fowler Rodriguez Valdes-Fauli and G. Luis Dominguez, for appellant. Heller Waldman and Eleanor T. Barnett, for appellees. Before CORTIÑAS and ROTHENBERG, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. CORTIÑAS, J. Favio Grisolia Sanchez (“Decedent”) moved his family to the United States in 2005 following a kidnapping attempt on his son, Fabrizzio Grisolia (“Son”), the previous year. Although he was attending school in Venezuela at the time of the attempted kidnapping, the Son was a United States citizen with an American passport.

After arriving in the United States, the Decedent, along with the Son and Ivonne Grisolia (“Widow”), resided temporarily in an apartment in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida, owned by the Decedent’s mother until 2006 when the Decedent purchased an apartment (“Property”) in the same building. The Decedent lived in the

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Mark Tannen v. Wendy Tannen

(NOTE: The Supreme Court wrote no full opinion in this case.  Rather, the Court’s affirmance of the judgment of the Appellate Division is based substantially on the reasons expressed in Judge Messano’s opinion, which is published at 416 N.J. Super. 248 (App. Div. 2010).)

Argued September 13, 2011 -- Decided December 8, 2011

PER CURIAM

 The issues in this matrimonial action include whether, for purposes of determining alimony, it was appropriate to impute income to a party based on her beneficial interest in a discretionary support trust. Plaintiff Mark Tannen and defendant Wendy Tannen were married for nearly eighteen years. During the marriage, Wendy’s parents settled an irrevocable, discretionary support trust with Wendy as sole beneficiary and Wendy and her parents as co-trustees (“Wendy Tannen Trust”). Before trial, the judge ordered Mark to name the Wendy Tannen Trust and other family trusts as third-party defendants. This case went to trial only on the issues of equitable distribution, alimony, and child support. In rendering its judgment following trial, the court applied the Restatement (Third) of Trusts to determine that the terms “support” and “maintenance” in the Wendy Tannen Trust required the trustees to distribute “such sums as are

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Let me ask you the following questions:

1.) Do you have a brokerage account in your own name?

2.) Do you own real estate in your own name?

3.) Do you own any other valuable assets in your own name?

4.) Does your medical practice have any valuable assets?

When I say “own name” that includes having assets owned by living trusts used for estate planning. If you answered yes to any of the above questions, you DO NOT have your core asset protection plan set up correctly.

Is it difficult to get an asset protection plan in place? NO! It’s mind-numbingly simple.

Would you like to learn asset-protection planning so you can diagram your own solid asset-protection plan?

Would you like to learn this subject matter and earn Category 1 Certified Medical Education (CME) credits?

Now you can because my Doctor’s Wealth Preservation Guide has just been approved for 21 hours of Category 1 CME credits.   The retail price of the book and up to 21 hours of CME credits is $150.   Through this special e-mail offer, you can buy this one-of-a-kind book and earn 21 hours of CME credits* for only $100.               To order, please click on the following link: Doctor’s Wealth

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In the recent case of Meyer V. Christie [1] the District Court of Kansas issued a charging order against a single member limited liability company (“SMLLC”) which allowed the creditor to reach the assets of the debtor’s limited liability company (“LLC”). This has resulted in many practitioners questioning whether the same charging order protections offered to multi-member LLCs are also available to SMLLCs. When evaluated in the proper context, the holdings of the court in Meyer should have been anticipated.

 
SMLLC Case Law

In Albright [2] the Colorado court interpreted the Colorado statute and determined that the charging order protections were not available in the context of the SMLLC at issue. In Olmstead[3], the court reached a similar conclusion. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Florida states that its “charging order provision establishes a nonexclusive remedial mechanism,” and goes on to state “there is no express provision in the statutory text providing that the charging order is the only remedy that can be utilized.”

The courts in both Albright and Olmstead were necessarily interpreting the LLC statutes in existence at the time in their respective states. Neither state’s statute provided express language making it clear that the charging

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

ALAN E. MEYER, et al., )) Plaintiffs, ))
v. )) No. 07-2230-CM)

DAVID J. CHRISTIE, et al., )) Defendants. )) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Following remand from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Meyer v. Christie, 634 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming in part and reversing in part Meyer v. Christie, No. 07-2230-CM, 2009

WL 4782118 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2009)), this court entered a final amended judgment in favor of plaintiffs Alan E. Meyer and John R. Pratt, and against defendants David Christie, Alexander Glenn, and D.J. Christie, Inc., in the amount of $7,170,603, plus $100 in punitive damages, along with costs. In an order dated July 18, 2011, the court addressed a number of motions, including: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Release of Supersedeas Bond (Doc. 394); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Issuance of Charging Orders (Doc. 395); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Issuance of Order of Garnishment (Doc. 397); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of General Execution (Doc. 398); and Defendants’ Objections to Form of Proposed Order for Disbursement of Supersedeas Bond (Doc. 414). That order was vacated as prematurely entered (Doc. 428), and the motions remain pending. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Release of Supersedeas Bond (Doc.

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GUN BO, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor/Appellee,
v.
JOHN CORK, Defendant/Judgment Debtor/Appellant, and
JCSC, LLP, Garnishee/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 10-0571.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, Department E.

May 19, 2011.
Polsinelli Shughart, P.C., Phoenix, By John J. Hebert, Andrew B. Turk. Andrew S. Jacob, Attorneys for Garnishee/Appellant.

Lewis and Roca LLP, Phoenix, By Robert H. McKirgan, Brian J. Pollock, Joshua R. Zimmerman, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor/Appellee.

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24, Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

WINTHROP, Judge.

¶1 JCSC, LLC ("Appellant") challenges the court's judgment ordering a writ of garnishment (non-wages) in favor of creditor Gun Bo, LLC ("Appellee"). Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting unauthenticated bank records into evidence. Appellant also contends that the court erred in treating John Cork and the Los Cabos trust as alter egos, in allowing garnishment of a debt actually owed by Appellant to the Los Cabos trust (not to Cork), and erred in finding that Appellant owed

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Giving assets outright to your spouse can create all kinds of trouble.

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